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&dquo;Total&dquo; war and &dquo;limited&dquo; war are part of
our daily vocabulary, and policy-makers and
scholars are trying to identify the conditions
under which the latter, rather than the for-
mer, can be made the framework of armed
conflict between the major powers, should
war erupt. Two of the most important
French political thinkers, MM. Raymond
Aron and Bertrand de Jouvenel, have been
preoccupied by the colossal warfare of the
last half-century. M. de Jouvenel was in-
spired by revulsion against the destruction
of World War II to engage in fundamental
considerations of political philosophy and
the attempt to develop the beginnings of a
&dquo;pure&dquo; political theory. M. Aron’s writings
are much more closely related to what he
calls the &dquo;conjuncture&dquo;-the convergence of
forces upon the international scene-and the
relation between war and politics is a more
central and unifying concern for him than it
is for M. de Jouvenel. But both men have
contributed views on the nature of warfare
and on the ways in which it has been and
can be limited. It is the purpose of this arti-
cle to summarize and analyze these views.
I. The Extension and Intensification
of Warfare
The words &dquo;total&dquo; and &dquo;limited,&dquo; as ap-
plied to warfare, are not wholly self-explan-
atory ; they require definition. The closest
that M. Aron comes to giving a definition of
total war is to describe it as &dquo;the merciless
mobilization of the national resources and a
race for inventions&dquo; (4, p. 23). This defini-
tion would seem to be acceptable to M. de
Jouvenel, who thinks of total war as involv-
ing &dquo;the total identification of the nation
with the army&dquo; and the full utilization of a
country’s resources (6, p. 185). By inver-
sion, therefore, limited war is war for which
only a fraction of the nation’s resources is
employed.’
MM. Aron and de Jouvenel are agreed
that warfare has become increasingly de-
structive, although their analyses of military
history are not identical because the par-
1 There are two other standpoints from which
M. Aron regards war. Borrowing an expression
used by Guglielmo Ferrero, he calls World War
I "hyperbolic," because of its generalization and
long duration. Hyperbolic war is not necessarily
the same as total war; M. Aron points out that
the complete German mobilization for World
War II was designed to produce total war but
to avoid a hyperbolic one (5, p. 175). M. Aron is
also concerned with the relations between wars.
The conduct of one war may pave the way for
another. World War II can be traced back di-
rectly to the hyperbolic character of World War
I, which accounted for the Russian Revolution
and the growth of fascism in Germany and
Italy. "It all seems as though, beyond a certain
point, violence became self-perpetuating. For
war, as for fissionable matter, there is a critical
volume. Since 1914, Europe has experienced a
’chain reaction’ of warfare" (4, p. 36).
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ticular arguments they advance and illus-
trate are not identical. M. de Jouvenel is
particularly impressed with the limitations
of medieval warfare. The Capetians fought
with seignorial contingents which were at
their disposal for only forty days; feudal
monarchs had to bear the cost of war out of
the resources of their domains alone; the
people of medieval cities could ignore wars,
provided only that they were located a lit-
tle apart from the theaters of operations (6,
p. 187). M. Aron does not deal with medi-
eval warfare; in discussing limited warfare
in the past, he emphasizes the European
wars of the eighteenth century, before the
French Revolution. Before 1789, wars had
limited objectives, and the employment of
limited forces reflected a correspondence
between means and ends. The soldiers of
the eighteenth century were precious mat6-
riel, difficult to replace. They were profes-
sionals who fought by trade and not for
ideas; they had to be kept under rigid dis-
cipline. This discipline could be maintained
only if the army did not move too far from
its base of supplies. Therefore, there was
little mobility of troops, who were always
encumbered with baggage and who took up
quarters during the winter. Generals were
prudent and avoided costly engagements;
they maneuvered and undertook sieges, but
they avoided decisive battles (5, p. 179).
However differently MM. Aron and de
Jouvenel approach warfare before the
French Revolution, they both see in that
event a major turning point in military his-
tory. The crucial, though not the only, in-
novation that accounted for the change was
the introduction of conscription by the Con-
vention in 1793. This opened, in M. de
jouvenel’s view, the era of cannon fodder.
It also opened, in M. Aron’s view, an era of
new and less rigid military tactics. Because
the price of soldiers was reduced, the lie-
itations on the older aimies were removed.
The Revolution, by augmenting manpower
and altering military organization and tac-
tics, changed the nature of warfare. It also
threw up new men at the head of the ar-
mies, men who were not prisoners of old
theories and old habits. By 1796, Napoleon
had devised a ne-v strategy of annihilation.
The nineteenth century escaped further
intensification and extension of warfare
after the Congress of Vienna, but the twen-
tieth century saw the destructive movement
pick up momentum again. M. de Jouvenel
emphasizes the gradual evolution, out of
improvised and empirical practices, of the
notion of the total identification of the na-
tion with the army in Germany during
World War I, a doctrine which was later
refined and carefully applied by the Nazi
regime. M. Aron generally offers a similar
interpretation. He sees the Nazi regime as a
political system geared exclusively to war-
fare, but he emphasizes the adoption by the
Germans of new concepts of military or-
ganization and tactics which originated in
Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. Again,
regardless of differences in their isolation of
particular causes of and stages in the de-
velopment, MM. Aron and de Jouvenel are
agreed on the nature of the development it-
self. There is a close relationship between
political organization and military organiza-
tion ; political revolutions have created mil-
itary revolutions; although the growth curve
of the intensity and extensiveness of war-
fare is neither constant nor unbroken, the
curve is upward. Both men observe that the
proportion of national resources employed
in warfare has increased. Both men indi-
cate changes that have taken place in mili-
tary morality. And M. Aron singles out as
another factor in the growth of warfare the
stakes for which wars are fought. Men once
fought for provinces or the adjustment of
frontiers. During World War I the stakes
were still only the relative strength of na-
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tions. By World War II the stakes were the
existence of nations.
II. Political Power and Technology
The crucial question, of course, is why
the extension and intensification of warfare
have taken place. To this question, MM.
Aron and de Jouvenel give answers that
sometimes coincide but are not identical.
M. de Jouvenel’s answer is by far the sim-
pler of the two. According to him, &dquo;every-
thing is thrown into warfare because power
[the machinery of government] commands
everything&dquo; (6, p. 187). It is inadequate to
attribute the growth of warfare to the am-
bitions of leaders or the needs of a nation
that is attacked. There were ambitious lead-
ers and hard-pressed nations when warfare
was limited. The cause of the scope and in-
tensity of modern warfare is &dquo;the material
and moral levers at the disposal of modem
governments.&dquo; It is the power of govern-
ments which makes total mobilization pos-
sible (6, p. 13).
It is clear that M. de Jouvenel is think-
ing of power over things as well as of power
over men, but it is on the latter that he con-
centrates his attention. The increase in the
political power of rulers (not the growth of
technology) is the central point of his anal-
ysis. In this context, M. de Jouvenel is in-
different to the form of political power ex-
cept only insofar as it affects the extent of
political power. It was the Germany of
World War I which produced the &dquo;doc-
trine&dquo; of total war, but it was democracy
(by which he refers to the French political
system of 1793) which &dquo;invented&dquo; total
war. Democracy may arm governments for
warfare to an extent that less popular forms
of government cannot. A government that
is remote from the people is not likely to be
able to exact as many sacrifices from them
as one that appears to be close to the peo-
ple (6, pp. 171-72).
M. Aron’s explanation of the growth of
total war (and the development of hyper-
bolic war) is less clear-cut and more cau-
tious. Like M. de Jouvenel, M. Aron sees a
correspondence between military operations
and political organization, but, unlike M.
de Jouvenel, he pays close attention to the
role of technology in affecting warfare.
While M. de Jouvenel explains total war
primarily in political terms, M. Aron ex-
plains it both politically and technologically.
If I understand M. Aron’s analysis cor-
rectly, it runs as follows: There is generally
a proportion between military means (re-
sources, tactics, and organization) and ends
(the military and political objectives). To-
tal war is characterized by the enormous re-
sources employed as means and also by
ideological passions, which not only enlarge
the means by making greater sacrifices ac-
ceptable to the combatants but also en-
large the ends. Means and ends being pro-
portional, any increase in available means
or enlargement of the desired ends increases
the other factor. Now means and ends may
be affected by both technology and politi-
cal organization. The military revolution of
1793, according to M. Aron, was caused by
a political revolution which increased the
resources in manpower, altered military or-
ganization and tactics, and produced new
strategies. The hyperbolic character of
World War I, however, had technology as
the &dquo;motor&dquo; of its evolution, although M.
Aron states that he does not present this in-
teipretation without reservation or qualifi-
cations. The intervention of the United
States was the direct result of the inability
of the Franco-British alliance to cope with
the new, technologically conditioned Ger-
man tactic of unrestricted submarine war-
fare. The development of war propaganda
was necessary because &dquo;sublime and vague&dquo;
principles alone were proportionate to the
violence, sacrifices, and heroism that the
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military technology produced and required.
As the cost of the war increased, so it ap-
peared to the allied political leaders that
the significance of the victory had to be en-
larged. &dquo;It was claimed that the peace
would be durable only if it were based on
terms dictated to the enemy after the de-
struction of the enemy. This bitter-end at-
titude was less the expression of a political
philosophy than a reflex of total war&dquo; (4, p.
33).
The military revolution of 1939 was the
expression of a political philosophy and,
like that of 1793, its origin was a political
revolution. Germany adopted Russian mil-
itary innovations and geared her entire po-
litical and social organization to warfare.
When the war broke out, it, like those of
1793 and 1914, was a war of ideologies,
but, while the clash of ideologies during
World War I was the consequence of tech-
nology, the war of 1939 was a war of
ideologies because of its political inspira-
tion. Germany started the war to establish
an empire, and the establishment of an
empire, in M. Aron’s view, assumes the
propagation of an ideology. Because it was
an imperial war, it was necessarily an ideo-
logical war. 
’
At the same time that technology and
political organization affect both the means
and the ends of warfare, the means and
ends of warfare affect both technology and
political organization (5, p. 173). Political
revolutions can create military revolutions,
but military revolutions can also create po-
litical revolutions. M. Aron suggests that in
one sense the totalitarian regime of Nazi
Germany emerged from total war in that it
accepted its i:nplications. And there is the
larger question, in which M. Aron is vitally
interested, of the consequences of warfare
upon the whole political conjuncture, for
M. Aron sees the actual battle, whether
politically or technologically conditioned, as
more important than the origin of the con-
flict or the treaty of peace in creating the
consequences of a war. Finally, although
he does not argue that technology is the
cause of the present conjuncture, M. Aron
does point out that, in a certain sense, there
is a single phenomenon-the expansion of
an industrial civilization based on science
and its application to industry-at the origin
of each of the three main characteristics of
the present international political scene:
planetary unity and the bipolar structure
of diplomacy; the spread of communism, of
which one of the two political giants is the
homeland, in Asia and Europe; and the dis-
covery of weapons of mass destruction (2,
pp. 250-51; 4, pp. 197, 202).
M. Aron sees &dquo;the adventure of science
and technology&dquo; as &dquo;the decisive fact of our
epoch.&dquo; &dquo;That is what is at the basis of the
social crisis of the European societies and
of the menace of death which hangs over
them&dquo; (3, p. 339). Yet, if technology is the
central fact, it is not a wholly determining
fact. Men are not condemned to exploit de-
structively the potentialities of their tech-
nology. &dquo;Technology has put its stamp on
modem barbarity ... [but] it has not been
demonstrated that men conceived these
horrible goals because they possessed the
means to achieve them. Knowledge puts a
variety of instruments at the disposal of
men; it does not determine how they use
them&dquo; (4, pp. 492-93).
There is much in common between the
analyses of MM. Aron and de Jouvenel.
Sovereign states are naturally rivals. All
states are not naturally ambitious and im-
perialistic, but the extensive preparation for
war of any one state requires its neighbors
to follow suit in order to maintain their se-
curity. Wars grow in intensity as the re-
sources at the command of governments in-
crease. The government feeds resources into
war, and the needs of war enlarge the gov-
325
emment’s claims upon those resources. War-
fare stirs passions, and passions enlarge
warfare. But while M. de Jouvenel centers
his analysis on the power of governments,
M. Aron centers his on the technology
which gives goverments so much power.
III. Limited War and Political
Organization
What avenues to the limitation of war-
fare do these two approaches to the causes
of total war suggest? For M. de Jouvenel,
whose analysis is the simpler of the two, the
theoretical answer to the question of how
to limit warfare is also simple. &dquo;Power is
linked to war, and if a society wants to
limit the ravages of war, there is no other
way than to limit the faculties of power&dquo;
(6, p. 177). The questions which remain,
of course, are whether and how this can be
done. For M. Aron’s analysis, the corre-
sponding prescription might appear to be
to stop or reverse the march of technology,
but M. Aron does not spend much time re-
jecting this solution: &dquo;Faustian men will
not abandon by themselves the road to
knowledge, even if that road also leads to
catastrophe&dquo; (2, p. 257). But while M.
Aron recognizes that the risks of catastrophe
exist, he does not hold that catastrophe is
inevitable, and he believes that technology
gives promise of enormous benefits. Tech-
nology intensifies and extends warfare, but
it also increases wealth, and M. Aron re-
gards the increase of wealth as a necessary,
even if insufficient, condition of justice and
social peace. &dquo;Only technological progress
permits us to envisage, on the horizon of
history, a civilization which would not be
based on slavery. Whatever they may say,
the opponents of technological progress are
all supporters of slavery&dquo; (3, p. 342). For
M. Aron, as well as for M. de Jouvenel, the
limitation of war requires a political so-
lution.
M. de Jouvenel is concerned with ana-
lyzing the growth of political power and
its consequences, one of which is the in-
creased destructiveness of war, but he does
not indicate the specific means by which
political power would be controlled, to his
satisfaction, in the modern world. He has
apparently cast himself in the role of diag-
nostician of what he regards as ills, but he
does not prescribe specific remedies. He
tells us the ways in which power has been
limited in the past, but he makes no recom-
mendations for the present.2 In general, he
sees in &dquo;moral authorities&dquo; and &dquo;intermedi-
ary social powers&dquo; the agents &dquo;which sur-
round, protect and direct men, preventing
and impeding the intervention of power&dquo;
(6, p. 455). With respect to the specific
question of limiting war, he argues that
history shows that aristocratic regimes are
best. Aristocratic regimes give the least to
warfare because they are the most resistant
to the expansion of centralized power. The
interests, prejudices, and class solidarity of
aristocrats all operate against their co-opera-
tion in the construction of a strong, cen-
tralized state which would limit their in-
dependence and their wealth (6, pp. 227-
28). Aristocratic regimes may seem to have
been inherently military because they were
governed by a warrior class, but this is mis-
leading because in the aristocratic system
the dominant class was the only warrior
group and the people did not become in-
volved in warfare unless the battle hap-
pened to take place in their vicinity (6,
pp. 177-78). But M. de Jouvenel does not
argue in favor of the generalization of aris-
tocratic regimes, or some modem counter-
part of them, in our time. In fact, he de-
-... -- ---- --- ----... -...... -- - -......... - - - - -- -- - --- - -- - --... -... - - - -... -- - -....
2 Unless it be in these sentences, near the
conclusion of a discussion of law: "We must re-
turn to Aristotle, St. Thomas, Montesquieu.
What they have said is tangible and none of it
is out of date" (6, p. 385).
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liberately avoids the question of whether
the institutions that can effectively limit
the power of governments can be created
and maintained by the conscious efforts of
men. This is a problem which implies, in
his view, &dquo;that of the autonomy and of the
efficacy of the human will, and, to be more
exact, of the limits of man&dquo; (6, p. 366).
M. Aron at one time also regarded the
internal organization of states as a crucial
factor in the limitation of warfare, although
only as one of several. Since preparation
for war requires a certain organization of
government and society, the internal organi-
zation of states is a matter of first impor-
tance for the maintenance of peace and
security. But while M. Aron may well agree
with M. de Jouvenel about the role of aris-
tocratic regimes in limiting warfare in past
centuries, he is unimpressed with the con-
sequences of aristocratic regimes in the age
of technology. Where aristocratic values
survived into the industrial era they were
not conducive to peace or the limitation of
warfare. &dquo;In spite of evervthing,&dquo; M. Aron
writes, &dquo;the Western societies increasingly
pacified economic life by submitting it to
the impersonal laws of the market. Efforts
at enrichment by conquest would seem to
be characteristic of military societies; the
more a nation retains the stamp of feudalism
( Germany, Japan), the more it inclines
toward imperialism&dquo; (4, p. 68). Technology
in the hands of an aristocracy turned out,
in M. Aron’s view, to be more destructive
than it did in the hands of the bourgeoisie,
which M. de Jouvenel judges severely. In
Japan, &dquo;as in Germany, industrial civiliza-
tion was inserted into a social context of
which the values were aristocratic and not
bourgeois. Industry provided an incompara-
ble means of satisfying the desire for power
and glory&dquo; (2, p. 279).
Writing during World War II, M. Aron
argued that the generalization of democracy
was one of the conditions of collective se-
curity. In one important sense the logic of
his position in favor of the expansion of
democracy is the same as the logic which
underlies M. de Jouvenel’s high regard for
the historic role of aristocracy. M. de
Jouvenel regards aristocracy as the system
which has most effectively limited power;
M. Aron regards democracy as the system
which today most effectively limits it. In
addition, M. Aron regards legitimate gov-
ernments (&dquo;regular governments, accepted
by the majority&dquo;) as less inclined than il-
legitimate ones to engage in unrelenting
warfare because &dquo;they are ordinarily neither
motivated by excessive ambition nor pushed
forward by fear&dquo; (5, p. 296). The argu-
ment is historically sound. The age of de-
mocracy has not been with us long, but, so
far, no major war has pitted democracy
against democracy. But the argument, of
course, breaks down at its point of applica-
tion at the present time. How can democ-
racy, or any legitimate government within
M. Aron’s meaning of the term, be imposed
on nations prepared to defend their different
constituent principles with all the weapons
at their command?
M. Aron never regarded the generaliza-
tion of democracy as more than one of the
conditions for the maintenance of peace and
the restriction of warfare. He saw two other
conditions as also necessary: a balance of
power and a limitation of military tech-
nology. The balance of power has been
established, but military technology has ad-
vanced at an unparalleled pace. In the face
of these developments, M. Aron has con-
tinued to devote his talents and energy to
studying the possibilities of limiting war-
fare in an era which is unique &dquo;in the fact
that the threat of unlimited war is posed
not by the bellicosity of man, nor by the
character of governments, nor even by the
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vastness of the stakes, but by the nature of
the available weapons&dquo; (1, p. 101 ) .
IV. Disarmament and Limited War
M. Aron has not been optimistic about
the prospects of disarmament (2, pp. 246-
59). An agreement on the reduction or
stabilization of conventional arms is con-
ceivable ; it would be useful as an indica-
tion of good will and peaceful intentions;
but it would mean that the great powers
would rely even more on nuclear weapons
than they do now. Moreover, M. Aron re-
gards such an agreement as unlikely, for
three reasons: its lack of critical signifi-
cance ; his opinion that neither Washington
nor Moscow is vitally interested in it; and
its dependence on inspection and control,
which have already failed in Korea and
elsewhere. A cessation or a limitation of
the race for nuclear arms would be more
significant, but M. Aron regards that as
even more unlikely than the first alterna-
tive, if only because it would imply the
cessation of research and because it could
be undertaken only at a point of equality
between the great powers, a point which
neither side can be sure it has reached. And,
writing in 1956, before the announcement
of successful missile launchings, M. Aron
took missiles development into consideration
and concluded that it would be impossible
to control numerous and concealed launch-
ing platforms. The only effective motive that
M. Aron could see, in 1956, for stopping
the armaments race would be the joint de-
sire of the current nuclear powers to keep
the other nations out of their club.
The armaments race among the existing
nuclear powers, then, is unlikely to be
stopped, however much it would be the
course of wisdom to stop it. Does this mean
that all wars in which the nuclear powers
may become involved must become nuclear
wars and that, once a war becomes a nu-
clear war, it must become a general war,
implying the total destruction of the com-
batants ? M. Aron’s answers are these (1, 2,
pp. 301-44): All wars need not be nuclear
wars, any more than the series of post-
World War II conflicts in Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East became nuclear wars. Even
if a local war became a nuclear war, it
would not necessarily be transformed into
a general war, although there would always
be the risk that one side would consider
the use of certain weapons as incompatible
with the limitation of the conflict. What is
questionable, however, is whether a gen-
eral war could be prevented from becoming
a total war. The central problem, therefore,
although not, of course, the only one, is that
of preventing local wars from becoming a
general war. How can this be done?
There are two parts to M. Aron’s answer
to this question. The first is for the Western
powers to relate their armaments to the
various kinds of wars that may erupt, there-
by avoiding being placed in a military situa-
tion for which their arms may be either
inadequate or too destructive. The West,
viewed collectively, should have four main
types of armaments. It must possess nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons, missiles, and
aircraft at least equal to those of the Soviet
Union. It must have large conventional
forces in Europe to prevent the occurrence
of faits accomplis and to demonstrate a reso-
lution to resort, if need be, to ultimate
weapons. It must have other large units
capable of intervening, with or without re-
course to atomic armaments, in local wars.
And it must have troops capable of dealing
with guerrilla warfare as long, at least, as
the Europeans want to maintain control
over certain overseas territories. This scheme
represents, of course, the application of the
graduated deterrent theory or, as M. Aron
prefers to call it, the graduated reprisal
theory.
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The second part of M. Aron’s answer is
concerned not with weapons but with the
stakes of the conflict. Total war would be
risked if one side tried to wrest advantages
from the enemy that the latter would con-
cede only after having struggled to the
end. These advantages, if I understand M.
Aron correctly, are inherent only in one
geographical area-Europe-while elsewhere
the stakes are not high enough for the
major powers to conduct a war of extermi-
nation, regardless of the arms they might
employ in a conflict. But, regardless of what
kind of war may erupt, even in the event of
a general war, M. Aron argues that the
West must not carve out for itself &dquo;objec-
tives that are incompatible with the sur-
vival and the dignity of the enemy coun-
tries.&dquo; This does not mean that it should
&dquo;confuse the renunciation of total victory
with the willingness to call it a draw. Mili-
tary successes are not excluded by a limita-
tion of the war.&dquo; It does mean, however,
that the West must not adopt a policy of
unconditional surrender. M. Aron does not
seem to have given up the hope that arma-
ments control may be achieved at some
future date-in fact, he cites it as the al-
ternative to catastrophe-and he urges that
the Western powers must currently prepare
for it, but in the present phase of the nu-
clear age his prescription for limiting war
is for the West to base its policy on grad-
uated deterrents and a willingness to nego-
tiate compromise peace.
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